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Problematising practice: MacIntyre and management  
 
By Donncha Kavanagh, published in Organization, 20(1), 103–115. 
 
Abstract 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s distinction between institutions and practices helps illuminate 
how powerful institutional forces frame and constrain the practice of organizational 
research as well as the output and positioning of scholarly journals like Organization.  
Yet his conceptual frame is limited, not least because it is unclear whether the activity 
of managing is, or is not, a practice.  This paper builds on MacIntyre’s ideas by 
incorporating Aristotle’s concepts of poíēsis, praxis, téchnē and phrónēsis.  Rather 
than ask, following MacIntyre, whether management is a practice, this wider network 
of concepts provides a richer frame for understanding the nature of managing and the 
appropriate role for academia.  The paper outlines a phronetic paradigm for 
organizational inquiry, and concludes by briefly examining the implications of such a 
paradigm for research and learning.    
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Problematising Practice: MacIntyre and Management 
 
Introduction 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s distinction between institutions and practices helps illuminate 
how powerful institutional forces frame and constrain the practice of organisational 
research as well as the output and positioning of scholarly journals like Organization.  
Yet his conceptual frame is limited, not least because it is unclear whether the activity 
of managing is, or is not, a practice.  This paper seeks to build on MacIntyre’s ideas 
by incorporating Aristotle’s concepts of poíēsis, praxis, téchnē and phrónēsis into the 
conversation.  Rather than ask, following MacIntyre, whether management is a 
practice, this wider network of concepts provides a richer frame for understanding the 
nature of managing.  The paper proposes a phronetic paradigm for organisational 
inquiry, and concludes by examining the implications of such a paradigm for research 
and learning.    
An anniversary is a time to celebrate, a time to remember the past, to review where 
we are or might have been, and to reflect on the embedded patterns of action that we 
might or might not follow into the future.  And there is much to celebrate after twenty 
years of Organization, which is now, by any measure, a top-ranked academic journal.  
More broadly, the community of critical management scholars is punching well above 
its collective weight, especially in the UK where some 15-20% of the highest ranking 
management academics (those with four ‘4-star’ publications in six years) are 
associated with critical management studies (Spoelstra and Butler, forthcoming). 
Similarly, business schools identified as being ‘critical’ in orientation – such as 
University of Leicester’s School of Management and the School of Business and 
Management at Queen Mary University of London – performed very successfully in 
the UK’s most recent Research Assessment Exercise (Rowlinson and Hassard, 2011). 
Of course ‘critical’ inquiry extends far beyond the UK.  It is also growing in 
popularity, especially in organisation studies, as illustrated in figure 1 which plots the 
number of articles in the Web of Science database that include the words ‘theory’, 
‘critical’, and ‘organization’ (the ‘adjusted’ count makes allowance for the different 
number of articles published in the database each year).   
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——— 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
——— 
Table 1 celebrates the birth and history of Organization by locating and marking the 
event within a ‘register’ of journal births.  One thing that’s noticeable from this 
register is how young the discipline is. Organization Science and Organisation 
Studies were ‘born’ in 1990 and 1980 respectively; management studies is older, but 
it is also a relatively young discipline as evidenced by the birth date of the field’s 
major journals. 
——— 
Insert Table 1 about here 
——— 
Looking at the birth and development of the journal in the context of other journal 
births reminds us of the wider systemic and institutional forces at play, forces that can 
easily overwhelm the aspirations of journal editors.  For instance, most people today 
would not associate Organization Science with radical approaches to inquiry, even 
though the editors of that journal, in its first issue, predicted that it would “loosen the 
normal science straitjacket in which the field finds itself …[and] stay open to and 
even encourage radical approaches” (Daft and Lewin, 1990: 7).  And if Organization 
has been more committed to experimentation – one cannot envisage Organization 
Science having a special issue on Christmas – it is still quite similar to other journals 
in the field, at least in terms of the amount of ‘critical’ research it publishes, 
notwithstanding its editorial vision (Dunne et al., 2008a). 
We can identify a range of powerful institutional forces that work to effect this 
isomorphism.  Journal ranking lists, and their use in tenure and appointment systems 
are clearly important, but so too are the conventions of the peer review procedure and 
the economics and politics of journal publishing (Gabriel, 2010; Willmott, 2011).  In 
particular, there is growing disquiet about the monopoly powers that publishing 
houses have acquired and are acquiring (Poynder, 2011), and the phenomenon of 
‘academic capitalism’ in which authors, reviewers and editors are complicit 
participants (Ylijoki, 2003).  
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Journal ranking lists and their use in review processes, such as the RAE and REF 
systems in the UK, can foster not only mimesis, but also disciplinary insularity, by 
encouraging scholars to publish in a small number of journals which works to 
privilege a narrow range of possible styles.  Fashion fosters homogeneity, as Simmel 
(1904/1971) observed a long time ago.  The fashion logic at work in organisation 
studies has led to much academic debate about which journals should be on the list, 
the appropriateness of the score obtained by different journals, the merits of the value 
system underpinning the scoring rationale, and the way specific genres of inquiry, 
locations, languages and traditions are excluded or privileged (Rowlinson et al., 
2011).  For instance, a running gripe is how a ‘US’ research approach dominates 
organizational research and marginalises an alternative ‘European’ tradition (Grey, 
2010; Hinings, 2010; Meyer and Boxenbaum, 2010; Willmott, 2011). 
Less obviously, but perhaps more importantly, these institutional forces affect the 
‘trade’ and circulation of ideas.  For instance, Battilana, Anteby and Segul (2010) 
have analysed the exporting and re-importing of ideas between European and North 
American communities of organizational researchers, through analyzing papers 
published in Organization Studies.  In a more extensive study, Oswick, Fleming and 
Hanlon (2011) examined the uptake and origins of theory contributions to 
organisation and management studies.  Their study showed that theories are sourced 
from a very diverse set of fields, and that the most popular theories in organisation 
and management studies are ‘imported’ from elsewhere.  They did not assess how 
many theories ‘produced’ in organisation and management studies are ‘exported’ to 
other fields, though it is practically certain that such exporting is relatively small and 
that a defining feature of the field is its massive ‘deficit’ in intellectual trade.    
The purpose of this introduction is to set the scene, identifying the particular 
contestations and challenges that Organization and other similar journals face.  
Interpretative frames help us describe, understand and engage with such challenges, 
and in this paper I leverage the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, especially his ideas on 
practice and institutions, for this purpose.  The next section of the paper introduces 
and summarises these concepts. 
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MacIntyre and Management 
At the centre of MacIntyre’s work is the concept of ‘practice’, which he defines as 
follows: 
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.  Tic-
tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football 
with skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess.  Bricklaying is not a 
practice; architecture is.  Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is.  So are 
the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the 
historian, and so are painting and music. (MacIntyre, 1981/1984: 187) 
For MacIntyre, practices are always situated in place and time, in a living, historical 
tradition.   
A second important concept in his frame is the notion of an institution.  Again, it is 
best to reproduce his own definition:  
Practices must not be confused with institutions.  Chess, physics and medicine 
are practices; chess clubs, laboratories and hospitals are institutions…They are 
involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in 
terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as 
rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only 
themselves, but also the practices of which they are the bearers. (MacIntyre, 
1981/1984: 194) 
Institutions are reflexive and open to change: 
So when an institution – a university, say, or a farm, or a hospital – is the 
bearer of a tradition of practice or practices, its common life will be partly, but 
in a centrally important way, constituted by a continuous argument as to what 
a university is and ought to be or what good farming is or what good medicine 
is (MacIntyre, 1981/1984: 222) 
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MacIntyre then proceeds to make an important and influential distinction between 
what he calls ‘internal goods’ and ‘external goods’.  To explain the distinction he tells 
a story of an adult encouraging a child to play chess.  Initially, this encouragement is 
effected through promising the child some tangible reward, for example sweets or 
money, if she plays the game.  Over time, the child comes to enjoy playing the game 
and will play solely for the love of playing chess regardless of any reward.  In a 
nutshell, this captures his distinction between internal and external goods:  the 
enjoyment derived through playing the game itself is an ‘internal good’ while the 
sweets or money constitute an ‘external good’.   As well as enjoyment and joy, a 
practice’s internal good also includes the attainment of the practice’s proper ends and 
the possession and exercise of its requisite skills and virtues. 
Crucially, MacIntyre associates internal goods with practices, and external goods with 
institutions.  Applied to research, one might understand an internal good as the joy 
one gets from writing, analysing, reading, collecting data, and the other activities that 
constitute the practice of doing research.   In contrast, Research Assessment 
Exercises, which are created and maintained by the institution rather than the practice, 
are a good example of an external good.  Such goods are “characteristically objects of 
competition in which there are winners and losers” and when achieved “are always 
some individual’s property and possession” (MacIntyre, 1981/1984: 190).  These 
distinctions are captured nicely by the actress Glenn Close who, in a recent interview, 
spoke about her love for the ‘craft’ of acting (an internal good) and her detachment 
from the entertainment industry’s intense concern with acting awards (external 
goods): “I love what I do and the craft of it…. I’m aware that the world likes to have 
winners and losers. I understand the entertainment value in that, of course, but as it 
applies to my craft it kind of doesn’t make sense” (Clayton-Lee, 2012: 42).  
While practices depend on institutions – “no practice can survive for any length of 
time un-sustained by institutions” (MacIntyre, 1981/1984: 194) – they can also work 
to create an unnecessary focus on external goods which can be harmful to the 
practice: “the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution” (MacIntyre, 1981/1984: 194).  In particular, 
MacIntyre is hostile to the bureaucratic manager, who he sees as the primary advocate 
of techniques that can damage if not destroy practices and their constituent virtues. 
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Virtues are the final important concept in MacIntyre’s frame, and he explicitly 
associates them with internal goods and practices rather than external goods and 
institutions:  “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and 
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving such goods” (MacIntyre, 
1981/1984: 191).  Again, virtues are understood and constituted contextually and 
historically:  
[First,] all morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and 
particular…and secondly that there is no way to possess the virtues except as 
part of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them 
from a series of predecessors (MacIntyre, 1981/1984: 127) 
And again, these goods and virtues emerge and change over time: “A living tradition 
then is an historically extended, socially embedded argument, and an argument 
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (MacIntyre, 
1981/1984: 222). 
MacIntyre’s distinction between practices and institutions, and his association of 
internal goods and virtues with the former and external goods with the latter, becomes 
somewhat confused when he admits:  
The making and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of 
institutions – itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a 
practice which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the 
virtues (MacIntyre, 1981/1984: 194) 
Thus, making and sustaining an institution can be understood as a practice of sorts.  
To clarify, it is useful to distinguish between an institutional practice and a core 
practice (though MacIntyre doesn’t use these terms).   
Is Management a Practice? 
The above summary of MacIntyre’s concepts and theoretical frame is necessary 
before we can consider the obvious and important question, ‘Is management a 
practice?’. While MacIntyre doesn’t address the issue explicitly, it is clear – based on 
his characterization of managers as no more than amoral implementers of bureaucratic 
rationality – that management is not a practice (Beadle, 2008).   Specifically, it is not 
compelling to describe business or management as a ‘productive craft’ since business 
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and management are never more than a means.  We can speak of the ‘business of 
farming’, or the ‘business of fishing’ but the concept of the ‘business of business’ 
doesn’t make much sense. Neither are there good examples of the excellence of 
business (as business) – save for vague and rather empty terms like ‘customer service’ 
– nor examples of the ‘internal goods’ of management that are in any sense specific to 
management.  And if management is a practice, then what and where is the institution 
with which it has a dialectic relationship? Since management is always related to 
something else, it is proper to totally and solely locate it within the institutional realm 
of particular practices.  A further argument draws on MacIntyre’s assertion that 
teaching is not a practice:  
I say that teachers are involved in a variety of practices and that teaching is an 
ingredient in every practice …Teaching is never more than a means, that is it 
has no point and purpose except for the point and purpose of the activities to 
which it introduces students. All teaching is for the sake of something else and 
so teaching does not have its own goods.  The life of a teacher is therefore not 
a specific kind of life.  The life of a teacher of mathematics, whose goods are 
the goods of mathematics, is one thing; a life of a teacher of music whose 
goods are the goods of music is another. This is one reason why any 
conception of the philosophy of education as a distinct area of philosophical 
enquiry is a mistake” (MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002: 8–9).   
In other words, it is inappropriate to extract the educational element out of different 
practices and put them together as a single practice.  The same logic applies even 
more so to the ‘practice’ of management, because, while it is relatively easy to 
identify an institution (the school), and internal and external goods associated with 
teaching, we cannot easily do this for management. 
MacIntyre’s argument that teaching is not a practice is less convincing if we restrict 
teaching to primary and second level education (for development see Dunne (2003)).  
It has more merit at the third level and raises interesting issues for our understanding 
of the university and the business school.  Indeed one would expect MacIntyre to be 
especially hostile to the business school because not only is it, in his view, an 
institution that fosters and promulgates bureaucratic rationality, but it is also premised 
on the false and dangerous notion of conjoining elements from different practices 
together. From this perspective, the attempt to construe management as a distinct 
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practice is best understood as a political (and unethical) move, in which management 
researchers and business schools are deeply implicated. 
However, there are a number of reasons why we might argue that management is a 
practice (for development, see Christensen (2012); Brewer (1997), Moore (2002; 
2005a; b).  First, ‘management’ is recognisably a “coherent and complex form of 
socially established human activity”, with its own “standards of excellence”.  
Presumably there are goods internal to the practice of management – even if these 
could only be identified through interpretative studies of managers – and so it appears 
to meet the requirements that MacIntyre sets for deciding whether a set of activities is 
a practice or not.  Second, MacIntyre’s rather narrow (and prejudiced) view of what 
managers do is not supported by studies of managerial work (e.g. Mintzberg (1973)).  
Not only do managers seek to maximise efficiency, but they also copy, follow rules, 
pursue individual goals, have fun, encourage employees, and a myriad of other things 
that constitute the human condition.  Third, even if we accepted MacIntyre’s 
understanding of the manager as bureaucrat, then the activities associated with this 
character still only constitute an institutional rather than a core practice, as defined 
above.   
Developing the Conversation 
MacIntyre’s set of concepts provides a useful critical take on management, on the 
business school and on the idea of the university.  Yet it is problematic for a number 
of reasons.  His ideas about a form of life  – based around activities like football, 
fishing, chess-playing, architecture and medicine – are initially seductive, but at many 
levels they are a long way from the reality of contemporary organizations.  He is 
clearly unhappy with modernity, bureaucracy and capitalism, but too often his critique 
comes across as wishful sentimentalising for a pre-modern romantic idyll. Moreover, 
his basic concepts are much too slippery when we try to apply them, generating all 
sorts of empirical conundrums.  Is farming a practice, or are the different types of 
farming distinct practices?  What practice is a brand manager part of?  Is the video 
game Grand Theft Auto a practice, just like the game of chess? How do practices 
emerge and disappear? 
Part of the problem is perhaps that MacIntyre has tended, in his seminal book After 
Virtue – by far his most cited work in management – to conflate a number of 
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Aristotelian ideas into his single concept of practice.  This section of the paper 
restores some of these distinctions, in particular, drawing on the work of Joseph 
Dunne (1993; 2005; 2011), with whom MacIntyre had an interesting dialogue about 
whether or not teaching is a practice (MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002; Dunne, 2003).  
In his masterful book, Back to the Rough Ground, Dunne (1993) discusses many of 
Aristotle’s major concepts but here I will focus on just four – poíēsis, praxis, téchnē 
and phrónēsis – as shown in Table 2. 
—— 
Insert Table 2 about here 
—— 
Poíēsis describes an activity associated with making or fabricating something, which 
necessarily terminates in and brings about a separate product or outcome that provides 
it with its end or telos.  Three types of poíēsis or domain of activity can be 
distinguished (though neither Aristotle nor Dunne make this categorisation).   
Artefactual poíēsis describes the activity of making some thing, such as building a 
house or making a chair.  In contrast, performative poíēsis involves no artefact, and so 
includes activities like performing a dance or gymnastics.  What is distinctive about 
the third type, influential poíēsis, is that luck or chance necessarily intervenes.  For 
example, a doctor may work at making a patient better, but despite the doctor doing 
excellent work, the patient may still die. 
Praxis, unlike poíēsis, is not structured around a separately identifiable outcome; 
rather it is the domain of activity where the end is realised in the very doing of the 
activity itself: “while making has an end other than itself, action cannot, for good 
action [praxis] itself is its end” (Aristotle, 2007: 6.5 1140b7). Thus, praxis has to do 
with the conduct of one’s live as a citizen; it is about activities such as being friendly, 
honest, truthful, loyal, helpful.  In essence, the distinction between poíēsis and praxis 
is between productive and ethical activity.   
Poíēsis and praxis are distinct domains of activity and each has an associated form of 
knowledge.  Téchnē, or productive knowledge, is associated with poíēsis and 
describes the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert in a specialised craft who 
understands the principles underlying the production of an object or a state of affairs.  
Dunne identifies two forms of téchnē: first there is the knowledge that explains how 
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an artefact comes into being; in other words it is a form of knowledge underpinning 
the ability to analyse and describe how an artefact is made.  A second form of 
knowledge is involved in actually making an artefact or creating a performance; in 
other words it is the knowledge underpinning the ability to manufacture an artefact or 
produce a state of affairs.  An important point about téchnē is that while it does 
contain a concept of ‘excellence’ (e.g. ‘I know how to make an excellent chair’) this 
does not provide a basis for ethical action.   
Phrónēsis, or practical wisdom, is the form of knowledge associated with praxis.  It is 
acquired and deployed not in the making of any product separate from oneself but 
rather in one’s actions with one’s fellows.  It is not knowledge of ethical ideas or 
universal principles (which distinguishes it from utilitarian and deontological ethical 
systems), but rather it describes a resourcefulness and perceptiveness of mind and 
characterises a person who knows how to act with virtue.  It is good, practical moral 
judgement. Phrónēsis is distinct from téchnē, just as poíēsis is distinct from praxis: 
“Phrónēsis cannot be … téchnē … because acting and making are different kinds of 
things” (Aristotle, 2007: 6.5 1140b3).   Téchnē is specialized and domain specific; in 
contrast, phrónēsis – while gained through domain-specific experience and 
recognizing that virtue is always realized in concrete situations – is neither specialized 
nor domain specific but is instead coextensive with living a good life. And while there 
is such a thing as excellence in téchnē, “there is no such thing as excellence in 
phrónēsis” (because phrónēsis is itself an excellence) (Aristotle, 2007: 6.5 1140b22). 
For completeness, it is worth distinguishing téchnē and phrónēsis from three other 
concepts in Aristotle’s frame: epistēmē, sophia and noûs.  Epistēmē is logically 
deduced knowledge of relations between objects that do not admit to change.  The 
paradigmatic model of how this form of knowledge comes to be is the deduction of a 
trigonometric theorem from geometrical axioms. Thus, geometry is a good example 
of epistēmē in Aristotle’s sense.  Sophia is the ability to think well and wisely about 
universal truths and theories. In contrast to phrónēsis, which is the wisdom associated 
with the practical matters of human life, sophia is the wisdom associated with 
thinking about “things much more divine in their nature than man, e.g., most 
conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavens are framed” (Aristotle, 2007: 6.5 
1141b1).  Finally, noûs is Aristotle’s term for intuitive understanding, which is 
distinct from sense perception and reasoning. Noûs is foundational in that it centres on 
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the ability to make sense of what is perceived and to reason: it is “the part of the soul 
by which it knows and understands” (Aristotle and Hicks, 1907: 429a9–10).   
These concepts provide a way of reframing the question of whether or not 
management is a practice to a somewhat different question about whether 
management is best understood as poíēsis or praxis.  In so far as management is about 
realizing desirable end results – for example, satisfied customers – it might properly 
be considered as poíēsis.   However, when one considers popular understandings of 
the nature of managerial work – e.g. Mintzberg (1973) which emphasizes the 
manager’s interpersonal, informational and decisional roles – it seems clear that 
management is also captured by Aristotle’s concept of praxis.  At the level of 
knowledge, it is also clear that knowing how to lead, handle disturbances, negotiate, 
represent, initiate change, allocate resources, disseminate information, monitor, and 
be a figurehead is not téchnē or productive knowledge, but rather phrónēsis (practical 
wisdom), which is acquired and deployed not in the making of an artefact but through 
interacting with others in one’s community.  Indeed since ‘managing’ can transcend 
the production of particular artifacts or the creation of particular states of affairs it is 
perhaps better understood as a form of praxis rather than poíēsis. 
The distinction introduced in this paper between core and institutional practice is also 
helpful, even if we know that practices are always embedded in one another and are 
always ‘leaky’.  Seeing management as an institutional rather than core practice is 
important because it helps us recognise and respond to the corrosive effect that 
management activity can have on core practices.  In particular, it highlights the way 
that attempts in different domains to identify and foster ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’ can 
work to shift the focus from internal to external goods.  In this respect, MacIntyre 
gives us a helpful frame for interpreting the trends outlined at the start of the paper, 
especially the way research has become a competitive game centred on the external 
goods of journal rankings and research assessment exercises, which work to diminish 
the internal good obtained through the actual activity of doing research, which also 
diminishes the practice of research work itself.  Concepts like internal and external 
goods are valuable because they provide an accessible and intuitively appealing 
vocabulary that, when used appropriately, can rebuff and limit the corrosive effect 
that managerial techniques have on core practices. 
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Towards a Phronetic Paradigm 
This paper began by briefly reflecting on Organization’s short history and context, 
noting, in particular, the game playing and institutional isomorphism that surrounds 
and infuses the journal’s activities.  I believe that Alasdair MacIntyre’s work – and 
especially Dunne’s (1993) more nuanced reading of Aristotle – provides a powerful 
frame for clarifying how we should make sense of what’s going on and how we 
should now proceed.   In this concluding section of the paper, I use these ideas to 
outline a phronetic paradigm of organizational research.   
A phronetic paradigm is centred on the idea, based on the concepts of téchnē and 
phrónēsis, that knowing and judgement emerge through the lived experience of 
making and acting.  It provides, inter alia, a distinctive understanding of the nature of 
academic work and the relationship between academics and practitioners, and 
between theory and practice.  It can be usefully compared with what we might call the 
epistemic paradigm, wherein practitioners are constituted as objects of research 
carried out by experts, and also as consumers of that research which takes the form of 
epistēmē.  In contrast, within a phronetic paradigm practitioners are conceptualised as 
critical, reflective researchers and perpetual students (Flyvbjerg, 2001; 
Antonacopoulou, 2010). Here, the issue is not about creating abstract knowledge 
(epistēmē) and then making it practical or relevant to practitioners, nor to instruct or 
dictate to them, nor to moralise.  Rather, the academic goal is to help practitioners in 
their reflective work: to develop their phrónēsis.  Part of the conceptual power of 
phrónēsis is that it counters the desire to create a systematic body of generalised 
knowledge (‘technical rationality’) and reminds us that we should neither forget nor 
seek to overcome the conditionality, situatedness and historicity of human life.  
Instead, it impels us to recognise and work with the dialectic between téchnē, which 
abstracts from past experience of making things, and phrónēsis which is always 
experiential, modifiable, and premised on the value of improvisation and 
indeterminateness.  The ethics of phrónēsis reminds us that tasks are not value-neutral 
nor can they be immunized against the human condition.  Phrónēsis provides the 
ethical foundation for téchnē, which is why one should not try to deploy the latter cut 
loose from the former.  For instance, one might make a table, ‘badly’, for a needy 
person, or one might play a flute, ‘excellently’, for the S.S. in Dachau, or one might 
be an ‘excellent’ HR manager in an illegal (or legal) drug distributer.   Phrónēsis 
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provides the practical wisdom to make a judgement on what’s right and wrong, good 
and bad, just and unjust in these cases (Nyberg, 2008). 
While there have been recent calls for a phronetic approach to organisational research 
(Nonaka and Toyama, 2007; Cairns and Sliwa, 2008; Antonacopoulou, 2010; Rämö, 
2011), a coherent phronetic paradigm – in which teaching, learning, research and 
management are centred on the idea of phrónēsis – has yet to be articulated or brought 
into being.  Doing so will be difficult because, as outlined in the beginning of this 
paper, powerful institutional forces, which are largely hostile to a phronetic paradigm, 
constitute and constrain the academic study of organizational phenomena.  For 
instance, if there was a deep commitment to situated studies then one would expect 
location to be identified in the title of published papers.  However, only nine of the 
most recent 100 articles published in Organization (and 5 in Organization Studies) 
include a country or location in the paper title.   Along with Dunne et al’s (2008a) 
analysis of ‘critical resarch’, this suggests that while Organization (qua community) 
might be playing the game well, it might perhaps be playing the wrong game.  
So, what might we do differently, and can MacIntyre help us map out a way forward? 
A long-standing criticism of MacIntyre is that, despite his indignant critique of the 
modern world, he offers little by way of alternative save for nostalgic hankering for 
long-lost and romanticized ways of living.  Thus his argument is innately 
conservative.  However, there is also a radical dimension to his thinking (see 
Blackledge and Knight (2011) for a collection of essays on his ‘revolutionary 
Aristotelianism’) that can be exploited within a phronetic paradigm of organizational 
research.  For instance, if we accept that management is not a practice, then profound 
questions are raised about our understanding of what and how we should teach and 
research, as well as the nature of, and rationale for, the institutions within which 
teaching and research are conducted.  Specifically, the implication of MacIntyre’s 
argument is that we should work to situate management teaching and research in core 
practices rather than collaborate in the inauthentic work of trying to make 
‘management’ a core practice itself.  Following this logic, it is difficult to see a 
rationale for the business school as conventionally understood, or a coherent 
epistemological basis for most management and organisational research.  This might 
be fanciful since it is difficult to envision a world without the industry of business 
education and research, but it does provide an additional and provocative theoretical 
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perspective on criticisms of the business school (Jones and O'Doherty, 2005; Dunne 
et al., 2008b; Starkey and Tempest, 2008) and on the hermetic nature of management 
and organisational research described at the outset of this paper. 
A phronetic paradigm also provides an understanding of knowledge production that is 
quite distinct from what is commonly known as Mode 1 and Mode 2 (Huff and Huff, 
2001). Mode 1 is concerned with discipline based scientific practice, where the 
concentration is on the quality of the work initiated and executed by academic 
investigators within a rather homogenous discipline that is collectively focused on 
conceptual development.  In contrast, Mode 2 knowledge production is problem-
centred, transdisciplinary, and centred on the needs of business and agencies that fund 
research.   These differences between Mode 1 and Mode 2 are routinely abbreviated 
to a distinction between ‘rigour’ and ‘relevance’.   In contrast, the concept of a 
phronetic paradigm suggests a quite different mode of knowledge production, which I 
will term Mode Φ, Φ (Phi) being the first letter of the Greek word for phrónēsis 
(φρόνησις).  If Mode 1 is centred on rigour, and Mode 2 on relevance, then Mode Φ is 
focused on ‘rectitude’, in so far as ethics and wise practice are at the heart of 
phrónēsis.  And if Mode 2 challenges the status that Mode 1 accords the individual 
researcher and academic community, Mode Φ emphasizes the academic’s 
responsibility and freedom to critique practice and practitioner understandings of 
what is ‘relevant’.  However, it must be a dialectic relationship that also respects and 
is embedded in the world of practice.  This might be articulated, in a journal like 
Organization, through various forms of Socratic dialogue between practitioners and 
academics that is centred on the rightness (and righteousness) of action. 
Mode Φ does not mean that either rigour or relevance are jettisoned.  Rather, just as 
Greek letters are routinely used in mathematics to indicate variables that can take 
different values, Mode Φ might best be understood as a mode of knowledge 
production that can incorporate, not only Modes 1 and 2, but also Mode 3, where the 
purpose is the common good, and Mode 0, representing private patronage of 
academic endeavour (Bresnen and Burrell, 2012).  What distinguishes Mode Φ, 
however, is that it is primarily concerned with what is right and ethical, within a 
broadly Aristotelian world view. 
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Conclusion 
MacIntyre’s reading of Aristotle gives us a helpful way of thinking through the 
conversations in, about and around journals like Organization, that are embedded in 
and are constituted by the dialectic between institutions and practice.  Building on 
this, Artistotle’s wider frame of terms, especially his concept of phrónēsis, provides a 
skeletal frame for a new form of critical management studies.  While the term 
paradigm might be over-used and abused, it makes much sense to speak of a 
phronetic paradigm, centred on Aristotle’s concepts of praxis and phrónēsis.  While 
such a paradigm exists only in outline, it can still be distinguished from the two 
paradigms that dominate contemporary organisational and management research: the 
interpretative paradigm, which is focused on describing how things come to be and 
how actors interpret the world, and the positivist paradigm, which is rooted in 
formulating epistēmē or scientific knowledge.  It is perhaps unlikely that a phronetic 
paradigm will emerge in or be associated with Organization, given the power of path 
dependency and institutions and the personal investments already made.  
Nevertheless, such a paradigm could provide an alternative model of engaging 
critically with managing and organizing, as well as new modes of researching, 
teaching and learning. 
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Figure 1.  Count of articles containing ‘theory’, ‘critical’ and ‘organization’ 
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 First issue of Journal 
1910-19 American Economic Review, Journal of Applied Psychology 
1920-30 Economica, Harvard Business Review, Journal of Retailing 
1930-39 Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Marketing 
1940-49 Journal of Finance; Human Relations, Personnel Psychology 
1950-59 Operations Research, Administrative Science Quarterl, Academy of Management 
Journal, Business History 
1960-69 Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Accounting Research, Industrial 
Relations, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Financial & Quantitative 
Analysis, British Journal of Industrial Relations 
1970-79 Journal of International Business Studies, Management Learning, Human 
Resource Management, Journal of Consumer Research, Academy of Management 
Review, MIS Quarterly, Journal of Occupational & Organizational Psychology, 
Journal of Management, Journal of Financial Economics, Entrepreneurship Theory 
& Practice 
1980-89 Organization Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Operations Management, 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
Journal Business Venturing, Academy of Management Executive, Leadership 
Quarterly 
1990-99 Organization Science, British Journal of Management; Information Systems 
Research, Organization. 
 
Table 1.  ‘Birth date’ of selected journals 
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Table 2:  Framing concepts (after Aristotle) 
 
Domain Knowledge Teleology Ethical 
Making (poíēsis) téchnē Yes (telos) No 
Acting (Praxis) phrónēsis No Yes 
